Profitez du streaming de ce film sur «drone guerre» directement sur Youtube.
ESCE – International Business School approfondit la réflexion sur « drone guerre ».
Cette vidéo est accessible sur youtube grâce à ESCE – International Business School.
concernant « drone guerre »:
Cette vidéo connaissait un certain engouement lors de notre récente découverte. Le compteur de Likes indiquait: 205.
La vidéo a une durée de 00:36:08 secondes, un titre de Les Drones et la guerre, simple évolution ou bouleversement radical ? et est présentée par [vid_author_name]. Voici la description correspondante :« Découvrez l’univers des drones, leur nature, leurs caractéristiques distinctes, les diverses missions qu’ils accomplissent, et les chiffres impressionnants de leur production en série.
Cependant, cette discussion ne se limite pas à la technologie ; elle s’aventure également dans les méandres des conflits internes, des questionnements éthiques, des conséquences indirectes, et des actes de transgression immorale.
Au fil de l’évolution incessante de la technologie des drones, nous sommes confrontés à des réalités complexes, alimentant des débats moraux, des tensions internationales, et des changements structurels déjà en cours.
___________________________________
Les Rendez-vous de la géopolitique
Une production ESCE : http://www.esce.fr/ecole-commerce/
Une émission présentée et animée par Fabrice Ravel et Olivier Jacquemond
Responsable éditorial : Christophe Boisseau
Moyens techniques : Digital Learning Services Omnes Education
Réalisation : Philippe La Roque
Assistant réalisation : Samy Sedkaoui
Direction artistique : Diptic Design Agency – http://www.diptic-design.com
_________________________________________
___________________________________
#esce #rdvg #géopolitique #ukraine #militaire #armées #strategies #drones #puissances ».
youtube est une plateforme populaire où les utilisateurs peuvent partager et explorer une multitude de contenus vidéo, allant des idées créatives aux perspectives uniques.
Les drones trouvent différentes applications dans les opérations militaires.
Les héros de guerre prennent la forme de pilotes de drones
Grâce à l’augmentation de l’usage des drones, une nouvelle catégorie de combattants a vu le jour : les pilotes de drones de guerre. À des milliers de kilomètres du champ de bataille, ces opérateurs exercent une influence déterminante sur le succès des opérations militaires.
De nombreux pilotes se transforment en icônes, enregistrant des succès impressionnants et jouant un rôle clé dans les résultats des batailles. Dans les conflits récents, le courage ne se mesure plus uniquement sur le champ de bataille, mais également dans la stratégie et l’expertise des pilotes de drones.
L’impact des drones sur les conflits futurs
L’accélération de la technologie laisse présager un futur où les drones seront encore plus au cœur des enjeux. Des drones autonomes, intégrant une intelligence artificielle, se manifestent et prennent des décisions sans l’aide de l’homme.
En utilisant des essaims de drones, des centaines d’unités pourraient révolutionner les méthodes militaires. En outre, la réduction des dimensions des technologies pourrait favoriser la création de drones de taille toujours plus réduite et dissimulée, compliquant leur détection et leur neutralisation.
De l’Ukraine aux autres zones de guerre, ce service identifie les innovations clés des drones militaires et leur transposition aux usages civils.
Les drones militaires : une percée technologique dans les stratégies militaires contemporaines
La manière dont les guerres sont menées a été profondément modifiée par l’essor des drones. Les grandes puissances militaires investissent dans des technologies de plus en plus avancées, capables d’exécuter des missions de reconnaissance, de frappe et de soutien aux troupes au sol.
Le MQ-9 Reaper, un drone de combat américain, est employé pour des frappes de précision. Dans le cadre de divers conflits récents, le Bayraktar TB2, un drone turc, est célèbre pour son rôle en Ukraine et au Haut-Karabakh. Le Shahed-136, un drone kamikaze iranien, est fréquemment déployé dans les conflits au Moyen-Orient et en Europe de l’Est.
Grâce à ces appareils, les armées peuvent frapper des cibles éloignées avec une précision remarquable, minimisant ainsi les dangers pour les pilotes humains.
Une nouvelle ère pour les drones FPV et kamikazes
Une caractéristique frappante de ces dernières années est l’emploi de drones FPV (First Person View) transformés pour le transport d’explosifs. Grâce à des lunettes de réalité virtuelle, ces petits drones, souvent basés sur des modèles civils modifiés, sont massivement utilisés en Ukraine. Leur prix abordable et leur performance en font des outils redoutables pour les missions stratégiques.
Ces drones sont souvent égarés après l’attaque, car ils sont pensés comme des armes à usage unique. Les soldats sans formation en pilotage avancé peuvent les exploiter sur le terrain, grâce à leur simplicité d’utilisation.
Les drones civils redéployés à des fins militaires
De nombreux drones destinés au grand public, en particulier ceux de la marque DJI (comme le Mavic ou le Phantom), sont utilisés pour des missions de reconnaissance ou même d’attaque. Ces drones, auxquels des charges explosives sont fixées par les combattants, deviennent des bombardiers improvisés.
La facilité d’accès et la qualité des caméras intégrées en font des outils incontournables pour le renseignement et le guidage des tirs d’artillerie. Ces drones, cependant, peuvent souvent être affectés par des contre-mesures électroniques, comme le brouillage ou le piratage.
Ce lien vous permet de voir la vidéo sur youtube :
la source: Cliquer ici
#Les #Drones #guerre #simple #évolution #bouleversement #radical
Retranscription des paroles de la vidéo: Drones and warfare. As the war in Ukraine looks to drag on endlessly, our attention increasingly focuses on arms issues as matters of reflection and strategic challenges. As the conflict began, Russia trained our attention on nuclear weapons and the threat of their use. The Ukrainian President urged the West to send reinforcements in terms of conventional weapons, including guns, tanks and aircraft. We should, however, address another unlikely weapon today: drones. Drones and warfare: a simple evolution, or a major upheaval on the battlefield and in terms of geopolitical balance? Fabrice Ravel and I will explore this question in today’s session. Hello, Fabrice. Hello, Olivier. Hello everyone. The question we’ve just raised entails a lot of key terms. Of course, the battlefield will be our concern to start with, followed by the geopolitical balances. Firstly, to understand how drones affect the battlefield, we may need to look at where they fit in, and the variety and missions drones are assigned. Perhaps we should begin with drones in terms of variety and types. 300, 10,000. Two figures will help us understand the impact that drones can have on the battlefield. The Ukrainian military loses over 300 drones daily, Olivier. That’s a monthly loss of almost 10,000 drones. The numbers alone should suffice to make us wonder about the role that drones have on the battlefield. To answer this initial question, which is part of more comprehensive issue, I believe that three aspects stand out particularly salient. The first aspect: what sorts of drones actually exist? The second aspect relates to the missions given to these drones. The third aspect is more quantitative. We may even get around to your second and third questions. Let’s start with the first aspect: we already see something clearly palpable in the fact that drones have already developed very differently in terms of categories or types. Since we now have a drone, I’m almost tempted to call it a firearm that can be controlled by a single soldier who can practically manoeuvre it with his arm. An image of a medieval falconer springs immediately to mind as this bird of prey takes off. They also have much larger drones, remotely controlled by teams in hangars hundreds of kilometres away. The hardware must therefore differ substantially among these types. There are three clear categories. One would be more of a tactical drone, designed for close reconnaissance, but also to view any potential initiatives that the enemy might have, while also being capable of making the first strikes. It’s clear that this is more of a military issue. There is also a second drone category, more closely related to what is referred to as Medium-Altitude, Long-Range remotely piloted aircraft systems, whose military acronym is not so fortunate: MALE. It’s clear that these drones carry out quite different missions, as they are much more involved in intelligence gathering and one-off strikes. A third category would then emerge, where it’s clear that in terms of weight and wingspan, we’re still talking about much larger drones. This third one entails High-Altitude, Long-Endurance drones, also referred to by the acronym HALE. These are the three main categories, though we shouldn’t overlook a number of kamikaze categories because of the war in Ukraine, which we’ll come back to. This relatively new development would be projected directly onto certain specific targets. We also have drones known as loitering munitions, which will entail a slew of other problems, because these drones patrol different areas along the front in search of targets. We shouldn’t, however, overlook civilian drones, which can obviously be reworked for military purposes. This simple description in terms of category and classification clearly underlines the importance of drones, but it’s hardly the only one. Yes, there’s is thus no standards for drones. Is that also be based on the diversity of missions? We can suggest four to our audience, and I’ll try to describe them chronologically. Doing so will enable us to better gauge the broadening scope of missions assigned to drones. We will thus be able to appreciate missions that seem to immediately underline, we can say this straight away, the drone’s versatility, which, is clearly a decisive and salient factor in the context of ascertaining whether drones are just part of a changing battlefield or a radical upheaval in upheaval in battlefields per se. The first type of mission came during conflicts elsewhere in the Near and Middle East in the ’60s and ’70s. The first missions conducted were rather missions to deceive with radar signatures, to deceive the enemy’s radar surveillance. Drones were thus sent out to saturate the enemy’s radar search while facilitating air attacks. The logic behind these first missions was therefore fairly limited. The second category of missions involved information, in a trinity of information, namely reconnaissance, surveillance and even intelligence gathering. The third category of missions is surgical, special one-off strikes. These drones fly extremely high in the air and cannot be easily spotted. This gives the impression that someone can be killed virtually out of the blue, decided by a command centre that you can’t even see. Here, we are already in the process of switching from information-gathering missions to more combat-oriented missions, right up to combat drones, which were developed considerably with, first of all, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, which we must remember, in the second half of 2020, and then obviously, as this war in Ukraine began on 24 February 2022. So we can clearly see four types of mission that only enhance the drone’s capabilities and versatility, which is a second argument that underlines the fact that we do indeed seem to have a weapon that is expanding considerably. In this regard, a third aspect should be added to the first two. Yes, because mission diversity goes hand in hand with capability, words with the number of drones available. We know the figures on how many drones are destroyed daily. This spells out a need for a far greater production capacity. This concerns the number of drones in the field, but also the number of countries that can produce them. One point of reference is the Drone Databook by Dan Gettinger, a researcher who founded a centre for the study of drones. His work spans over 300 pages, and an initial clue indicates that over 102 countries have military drones worldwide today. This is remarkable when you realize that the UN consists of 194 countries. Gettinger’s book proposes a classification system, particularly in relation to drone weight, and includes many pages corresponding to datasheets on each country, each consisting of a unique description, type and quantity of their equipment. This book has a number of interesting aspects. There are apparently over 30,000 military drones in use worldwide today, which is already a daunting number. Even more interesting, however, this number has increased by 58% over the last decade. Progress in this field has been substantial. In 2019, the overall budget for military drones was roughly $8.65 billion. And in terms of forecasts, many consider that this will hit $19 billion by 2027, though others even consider that it will reach $25m or $27m billion, or even $30 billion by 2025. All these figures show a seemingly vertiginous growth in the use of drones in terms of number of countries involved, number of drones developed and also the amount of money invested in each of them. This has 3 aspects. Firstly, the different drone categories; secondly, the associated range of missions; and thirdly, the magnitude of production and amount of money allocated. This all seems to lead us towards the same perception: the growing importance of drones on the battlefield today. One question that should be asked right now is: Is this just a fad? Is this just something being put in place because it corresponds in particular to a certain number of geographical topographical situations, or regarding the identity of the players? Or are we dealing with a genuine underlying dynamic that is radically transforming battlefields and therefore obviously risks geopolitical repercussions? Our discussion is revolving around such a question right now. We can attempt to answer this question by breaking it down and looking at the aspects for which we do have an answer. We can begin with the question of the drone and its characteristics. Do drones have unique characteristics that render them especially useful? I believe that one in particular manages to bring together or combine a certain number of its features as we can sense almost intuitively. I’m going to use a term that may seem positive, but we should realise that it all depends on how we deploy them. Drones let you virtually overcome all limits. Drones let us overcome limits, firstly, as we can see, in terms of geographical confines, since its aerial use means that it can penetrate the front lines. Drones can also overcome borders, since they are relatively discreet, which is what we would like our audience to notice. This relative discretion ultimately enables drones to cross borders and therefore not respect airspace. Drones can thus move around airspace and across borders quite quickly, and also intervene, completely, regardless of the governments or authorities in place. They can thus really break international law, and even the law of the countries where they are. Drones must thus overcome a number of constraints. And there are others. We can in fact see them clearly in a older book whose title says it all: Hunter Killer: Inside the Lethal World of Drone Warfare. The book was written by US lieutenant colonel T. Mark McCurley, a former pilot who suddenly became a drone pilot for the drones we mentioned earlier, now faced with missions in asymmetric wars, but in which the final mission is to physically eliminate a targeted number of people. An interesting book on this is David Sanger’s Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power, written in 2012. Page 279 contains a very interesting reflection regarding drones. It says that the Obama administration authorised over 250 secret drone strikes and that’s under Chapter 10, whose title is quite interesting because it’s actually: the dark side of the light footprint. The light footprint is supposed to be the footprint of the drones, helping to avoid direct confrontation, but the dark side, of course, refers to the Dark Side of Star Wars. There’s clearly a wholly immoral side to drones, and let’s be honest, its reputation has been tarnished pretty quickly. We’ve quickly gone from the ecstasy of these technological capabilities to the fact that they pose a whole host of moral problems. There was also a great deal of collateral damage during these strikes. Two countries in particular come to mind: Pakistan and Yemen. In this case, the drone’s ability to completely overcome these constraints. There’s a third limit that’s even more interesting, it seems to me, and that’s that drone intervention can be nonstop. Because ground crews can replace each other and drones, some have flight capacities longer than 10, 20 or even 30 hours. Having drones enables us to constantly pressure our enemies, thus freeing ourselves. You may recall the images of the First World War when troops were sent by rotation —the famous Verdun route— to rest and recover and then return to combat. That’s no longer possible. Now drones can penetrate the front line and hit the enemy constantly. What’s more, we’ve crossed the line here. And what’s quite interesting, if I may say so, is that it can, from a technological point of view, be dressed up in two totally different ways. The drone is omnipresent because it is totally silent. And so, as you can see from the various accounts, for those who might be interested, in the books we’ve already mentioned, the enemy is on constant alert. Imagine how stressful and exhausting it must be to keep watch without being totally sure that you’ll be able to anticipate a strike because it’s silent. Yet there are also much smaller drone models with a constant noise or buzz, without necessarily being distinguishable. And then we’re totally taken in by the constant noise. We’re thus dealing with a weapon that’s even overcome psychological limits. There are already intrinsic qualities clearly optimizing the potential of our armies, but that’s far from being everything. Yes, so we can clearly see the idea of transgressing all boundaries, as well as the psychological impact this weapon can have. Perhaps more concretely, the drone can also be used to replace weapons that have failed. That’s very important. That’s very important, because it will help us understand that, far from being a fad, there’s an exponential effect. In this regard, two essential logics should be taken into consideration in this virtually suppletive weapons approach, if I can call it that. There’s an approach that’s linked to the fear of losing fighters. There are also approaches linked to the fact that other weapons are not readily available, since they are too expensive, too few in number and, ultimately, create a kind of apprehension about using them. Such as? First of all, the fear of losing fighters is fairly easy to understand. By definition, a drone is piloted by someone who may be several hundred kilometres, or even several thousand kilometres, away. A drone loss is a material loss, and forestalls any loss of human life, which is very important in terms of public sensitivity on limited operations, but also very important in the context of a war, because training pilots takes a long time. There’s a lot of talk about the fighter jets we’re sending to Ukraine, but the training time for even an experienced pilot using advanced and complex technologies is extremely long. Above and beyond the human aspect and public sensitivity, there’s the professional aspect of saying: we might lose soldiers, who taken an enormous amount of time to train. But there’s a second aspect that’s even more interesting. Here, we’re dealing with cost. Because what I think is important to stress is that in the conflict in Ukraine, the Russian air force normally has air supremacy. With the manpower and equipment it has at its disposal, it should be able to assert its superiority in the skies, but it does not. Yes, Russia’s partly stunned by the meshing of Ukraine’s anti-aircraft defences, but also by the fear of losing a number of important aircraft, whose technology and production time are frightening in advance, because the fear is one of losing a major asset. On page 55, two Chinese colonels, Wang Xiangsui and Qiao Liang, wrote a book in 1999 entitled Unrestricted Warfare, which I think is a very interesting reflection on the relationship between the Americans and arms financing. In this regard, in the 1960s-1970s, the cost of developing an aircraft like the F-14 or F-15 was one billion dollars. Then, much later in the ’90s, when we came to the development cost, and strictly development cost, not the production cost, of the F-22, this number spikes to $13 billion. When we start adapting the reasoning, since now we’re talking about sums mentioned in 1999, so we’d obviously have to adapt the sums, for the Northrop Bombardier B-2, what’s quite surprising is that while the F-22 to be produced today costs more than $100 million, the B-2 bomber per unit was calculated by the Chinese in ’99 at over $15 billion per unit. Today, this sum is about $3–4 billion if you count depreciation, but if you add up the research, development and study flights, the Chinese came to the rather piquant conclusion that, in fact, for each B2 produced, the Americans spend three times its weight in gold. So, in fact, we’re faced with a situation where these weapons are remarkable, except that in fact we’re gripped by the dread of losing such fundamental pieces. There’s a kind of inhibition to using them, and somewhere out there, drones are making it possible not only to overcome this constraint, but also to return to the logic of density in terms of the use of equipment to saturate enemy defences. As you can see, the first stage of our approach focused on the drone’s intrinsic characteristics. But then, in the second stage of our approach, the drone will also be able to compensate for shortcomings or problems such as we were confronted with on the battlefield. And that’s not all. Yes, since here we’re looking at armies almost generically. Yet a more detailed look shows that the different components of the army are all interested in drones and want to use them. We’re in the process of widening the scope of our prism, and that’s important, given our problem. Because here, if we broaden the scope, we notice one thing: when weapons are major, they become issues of power. There’s something very important to remember here. We did this in one of our previous sessions, which was dedicated to military issues. We already mentioned that each army is subdivided into three main branches. There are more, including the army, navy and air force. And so, one interesting point that Seth Frantzman makes is that, in reality, he shows that the US Army, US Navy and US Air Force are vying fiercely to gain the favours of drone programme development, to secure a majority of drone programmes, and even monopolise the programme. Hollywood also has drones in its claws. Hollywood is appropriating it in films and TV series. Take the 2014 film, Good Kill, for instance, the plot deals with drones. How about a series as famous and renowned as « Homeland », whose first episode of season 4, which is attached to the main heroine, is titled the Drone Queen. Here, the importance of the drone has reached such a level that it’s outstripping even the Army, Navy and US Air Force staffs mentioned, and has now gone full-on Hollywood. Jean-Michel Valantin had already made this point in a book written for Editions Autrement in 2010 called Hollywood, le pentagone et le monde (Hollywood, the Pentagon and the World), uncovering an internecine quarrel within the US military over who would have the major share, or even the monopoly, of the use of nuclear weapons. Here, we’re putting into perspective two dynamics which, through their intermediaries, place the drone on an almost equal footing with nuclear weapons. By the way, if I may add something in this regard, which I sometimes explain to students in class, what’s quite interesting about these films from that period is that we clearly have 3 films that are symbols, respectively, of the US army, the navy and, if you think about it, the air force. Because Rambo II is about the fact that we can’t win a war if we don’t have the courage to get involved on the ground. I almost want to say in the clay or in the earth, Sartre in dirty hands, you really have to get down to it. That’s Rambo II. It’s clear, which we can say with a little detached pleasure in 2023, as Top Gun, especially the first one, is still a panegyric on the US naval air forces, which I remind you are members of the American army and show that nothing can be done without them, because they are able to project themselves anywhere in the world, more or less elegantly. And then, perhaps more surprisingly independently, we have Independence Day, where it’s clear that the US Air Force says ‘Our two colleague services are very interesting, but in the end, the US Air Force, we’re the ones in control, because by definition, as soon as we’re dealing with something major, we’re the ones called in’. So we already had this confrontation, which shows the importance of this rivalry. Here we have three characters. The intrinsic characteristics of the weapon, its ability to offset the shortcomings of other weapons, and then we have the craze, which is proof that we are indeed dealing with an upheaval of the battlefield, which we can imagine will itself be a source of upheaval in terms of geopolitical equilibrium. Yes, because if you add up all these dimensions, you can see that the drone is here to make its mark on the landscape, and that a greater number of players have taken possession of it. Which geopolitical logics in particular will be shaken up? If we want to understand the geopolitical upheavals we’re seeing or guessing, I think that beyond the three traditional countries that first come to mind in producing drones, namely the United States, China and Israel, there are two new players who are emerging; well, two new players in the last ten years or so. They appear to be very important. First, there’s Iran. There’s one drone, the Shahed 136, which is gaining a very important reputation in the Ukrainian conflict, as the Iranians are supplying Russia with drones. That fact is quite interesting in itself. Iran supplies drones to Russia. With a wingspan of around two metres at delta L, the drone is quite slow. With a top speed of 180 km/h, it’s a kamikaze drone that has a saturation effect, pounding enemy defences and targets, and in fact monopolising a number of Ukrainian anti-aircraft defences. Once you’ve seen it, it’s pretty easy to shoot down, but the problem is that it’s very difficult to detect in radar terms, and following on from what we said earlier, the Ukrainian soldiers have nicknamed it the « moped », because in fact it has a sort of double-cycle engine. It’s quite interesting to imagine the psychological sensation you must have when you start to perceive a cell phone noise that you can’t hear in the street. That’s the drone. But that’s not all. There’s also the Mohajer-6, an observation drone that the Iranians supply to the Russians. What’s very important information to have is that apparently, according to US intelligence studies, the Iranians are squarely in the process of building a drone manufacturing plant in Russia, which would be ready by early 2024. Here, we’re much more than just supplying drones, we’re able to supply production lines to a customer. But there’s one player that I think is unavoidable to mention, to highlight, and who, it seems to me, is unquestionably the main player in the drone market, and that’s Turkey. There are three aspects that seem to me to be important to put in place to support the fact that Turkey is really the country truly on the rise, mainly because of drones and, it seems to me, once again, in a totally undeniable way. First, the operational success. Let’s not forget that Turkish drones were certainly a major factor in Azerbaijan’s success in the Nagorno-Karabakh war against Armenia in the second half of 2020, and that there have been other precedents. There were three interventions by Turkish armed forces in northern Syria. There also was undeniable victories of the side Turkey aided in the civil war in Libya in 2020, and a UN report said that Turkish drone interventions were the main factor that changed the balance of power between the belligerents in Libya. Turning to the war in Ukraine, Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 has become more than just a symbol. It’s become almost a kind of iconic totem, because the Turks have supplied the Bayraktar TB2, a combat drone with a range of over 27 hours that can attack the enemy. The Ukrainians liked it so much that they made a music video featuring a chorus repeating the drone’s name ‘Bayraktar’ in an wholly lyrical style. The drone obviously enchants the battlefield, and the Turks are clearly playing a decisive role. In fact, one thing we can’t fail to notice is that they’re having a genuine operational success. They’re reputation is now worldwide. But what’s interesting to note is that beyond this technical performance, which today puts them ahead of the Chinese drones, there’s another performance that’s interesting about the Turkish drones, and that’s that they’re much cheaper, and this resonates with what we said before, compared with American and Israeli drones. And if we look closely, Turkey, in addition to serving the Ukraine, has Morocco, Qatar, Poland and Romania as customers, which means that Turkey is now supplying drones to NATO countries. And the same questions, a priori, even if not confirmed by either Ethiopia or Turkey, Turkey is sending drone programmes to Ethiopia. It’s quite interesting, because it’s clear that even if it remains a secret, it’s a reflection of the importance that drones are acquiring. And there’s a third important parameter to highlight, and that’s the fact that this technological performance is increasing all the time. Because the Turks have developed a new Bayraktar version and alongside this new model, Bayraktar is now capable of carrying additional weapons. They have additional drones: Anka and Karayel. However, on 10 April 2023, Turkey President Erdoğan inaugurated a 32-metre-long drone carrier. You can imagine the exceptional technology involved. The Anadolu, the most important ship in the Turkish navy. We can thus understand how Turkey and Iran are in the process of acquiring far greater military power than in the past, thanks to this drone which, by turning battlefields upside down, with the advent of these powers that have mastered the technology, is bound to bring about upheavals in the geopolitical balance. Yes, because we could ask ourselves if this is just an opportune moment, or is this a major trend that is set to accelerate and become more pronounced? There are two aspects which, it seems to me, will reinforce this dynamic, or which may tend to reinforce it. There’s a tactical aspect and also a technological aspect. The tactical aspect is easy enough to state, but should not be underestimated. The tactical aspect is what the military staffs will be able to do with this new weapon, which clearly offers them unrivalled possibilities. And here there’s a comparison to be made with the tank, which was still in its infancy at the end of the First World War, and which, at the end of that war, was the subject of major doctrinal debates. Some names immediately are called to mind. Liddell Hart, to whom we dedicated a session, John Fuller, colonel and later general Charles de Gaulle and Heinz Guderian. And it’s easy to see that all their reflections and tactical revolutions will lead to an upheaval on the battlefield, which will in fact lead to mobility and, to put it bluntly, blitzkrieg. And totally change what we thought was definitively in place with the wars of position in ’14-18. This is important when you remember that there are wars of position in Ukraine today. In this regard, general staffs will play a decisive role. Let’s not forget technological advances. We may first think of speed, especially with all the talk of hypersonic speeds on missiles or cruise missiles, or of acquiring new dimensions. In late 2022, the Ukrainians developed maritime drones to attack Russian ships, so we’d have drones entering a new dimension. These two technologies are interesting, but I think there’s another that will exponentially amplify the drone’s leading role as it now has. Is that the technological parameter? That’s the technological parameter. What is this technological parameter? Artificial intelligence. Imagine an artificial intelligence developed with a weapon that breaks all limits and is versatile. In fact, a drone with artificial intelligence with no limits in terms of borders or routes. A drone that can change at will from the route as prefigured to avoid defence measures, which means that in reality, even those who send it no longer know what route it is taking and it can make its own decision as to whether or not to eliminate the target it has in front of it. In fact, the drone is the perfect armed extension of artificial intelligence. We might even say that it’s the strong arm. Since the nuclear weapon, has it been possible, in terms of conventional weapons, to develop a weapon with such high potential for mankind, and to put it to military use? There’s an upheaval. Upheaval on the battlefield and upheaval in geopolitical balances. And in fact, this upheaval has already begun. Fabrice, I think we’ve rarely had such a clear and firm conclusion to the question. Thank you. Thank you. We’ve reached the end of this latest session of Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique. Thank you everyone for for following us. .
Déroulement de la vidéo:
18.84 Drones and warfare.
18.84 As the war in Ukraine looks to
drag on endlessly,
18.84 our attention increasingly focuses
on arms issues as matters of
18.84 reflection and
strategic challenges.
18.84 As the conflict
began, Russia trained our attention
18.84 on nuclear weapons and
the threat of their use.
18.84 The Ukrainian President urged the
West to send reinforcements in terms of
18.84 conventional weapons, including guns,
tanks and aircraft.
18.84 We should, however,
18.84 address another unlikely weapon today:
drones.
18.84 Drones and warfare:
a simple evolution, or a major upheaval
18.84 on the battlefield and
in terms of geopolitical balance?
18.84 Fabrice Ravel and I will explore this
question in today&;s session.
18.84 Hello, Fabrice.
18.84 Hello, Olivier.
Hello everyone.
18.84 The question we&;ve just raised
entails a lot of key terms.
18.84 Of course, the battlefield will be
our concern to start with, followed by
18.84 the geopolitical balances.
18.84 Firstly, to understand how drones
affect the battlefield, we may need
18.84 to look at where they fit in,
and the variety and
18.84 missions drones
are assigned.
18.84 Perhaps we should begin with drones
in terms of variety and types.
18.84 300, 10,000.
18.84 Two figures will help us understand
18.84 the impact that drones can have
on the battlefield.
18.84 The Ukrainian military loses over
300 drones daily, Olivier.
18.84 That&;s a monthly loss of
almost 10,000 drones.
18.84 The numbers alone
should suffice to make us
18.84 wonder about
the role that drones
18.84 have
on the battlefield.
18.84 To answer this initial
question, which is part of more
18.84 comprehensive issue, I believe that
three aspects
18.84 stand out
particularly salient.
18.84 The first aspect:
18.84 what sorts of drones
actually exist?
18.84 The second aspect relates to the
18.84 missions given
to these drones.
18.84 The third aspect is
more quantitative.
18.84 We may even get around to
your second and third questions.
18.84 Let&;s start with the first aspect:
we already see something clearly palpable
18.84 in the fact
that drones have already developed
18.84 very differently in terms of
categories or types.
18.84 Since we now have a drone,
I&;m almost tempted to call
18.84 it a firearm that can be
controlled by a single soldier who
18.84 can practically
manoeuvre it with his arm.
18.84 An image of a medieval falconer
18.84 springs immediately to mind as
this bird of prey takes off.
18.84 They also have much larger
drones, remotely controlled by
18.84 teams in
hangars
18.84 hundreds of
kilometres away.
18.84 The hardware must therefore
18.84 differ substantially among
these types.
18.84 There are
18.84 three clear categories.
18.84 One would be more of
a tactical drone,
18.84 designed for
close reconnaissance,
18.84 but also to view any potential initiatives
that the enemy might have, while also being
18.84 capable of making
the first strikes.
18.84 It&;s clear that this is more
of a military issue.
18.84 There is also a second drone category,
more closely related to what is
18.84 referred to as Medium-Altitude,
Long-Range remotely piloted
18.84 aircraft systems, whose military
18.84 acronym is not so fortunate:
MALE.
18.84 It&;s clear that these drones carry
out quite different missions,
18.84 as they are much more
involved in intelligence
18.84 gathering
and one-off strikes.
18.84 A third category would then emerge,
18.84 where it&;s clear that in terms
of weight and wingspan,
18.84 we&;re still talking about
much larger drones.
18.84 This third one entails High-Altitude,
18.84 Long-Endurance drones, also referred to
by the acronym HALE.
18.84 These are the three main categories,
though we shouldn&;t overlook a number of
18.84 kamikaze categories because of
the war in
18.84 Ukraine, which we&;ll
come back to.
18.84 This relatively new
development would be projected
18.84 directly onto certain specific
targets.
18.84 We also have drones known as
loitering munitions, which will
18.84 entail a slew of other problems,
because these
18.84 drones patrol different areas
along the front
18.84 in search
of targets.
18.84 We shouldn&;t, however,
overlook civilian drones,
18.84 which can obviously be reworked
for military purposes.
18.84 This simple description in terms of
category and classification
18.84 clearly underlines the
importance of drones,
18.84 but it&;s hardly
the only one.
18.84 Yes, there&;s is thus
no standards for drones.
18.84 Is that also be based on
the diversity of missions?
18.84 We can suggest four to our audience,
and I&;ll try to
18.84 describe them
chronologically.
18.84 Doing so will enable us to
18.84 better gauge the broadening
scope of missions assigned
18.84 to drones. We will thus be able to
appreciate missions
18.84 that seem to immediately
underline, we can say this
18.84 straight away, the
drone&;s versatility, which, is
18.84 clearly a decisive and salient factor
in the context of ascertaining
18.84 whether drones are just part of a
changing battlefield or a radical
18.84 upheaval in upheaval in
battlefields per se.
18.84 The first type of mission came
during conflicts elsewhere in
18.84 the Near and Middle East
in the &;60s and &;70s.
18.84 The first missions conducted
18.84 were rather missions to deceive
with radar signatures,
18.84 to deceive the enemy&;s
radar surveillance.
18.84 Drones were thus sent out
to saturate
18.84 the enemy&;s radar
search while facilitating
18.84 air attacks.
18.84 The logic behind these first missions
was therefore fairly limited.
18.84 The second category
of missions involved
18.84 information, in a trinity of
information, namely
18.84 reconnaissance,
surveillance
18.84 and
even intelligence gathering.
18.84 The third category of missions
18.84 is surgical,
special one-off strikes.
18.84 These drones fly extremely
high in the air and
18.84 cannot be
easily spotted. This gives
18.84 the impression that someone can be
killed virtually out of the blue,
18.84 decided by a command centre
that you can&;t even see.
18.84 Here, we are already in the process
of switching from information-gathering
18.84 missions
to more combat-oriented
18.84 missions,
right up to combat drones,
18.84 which were developed considerably
with, first of all, the war in
18.84 Nagorno-Karabakh, which
we must remember,
18.84 in the second half of 2020,
and then obviously,
18.84 as this war in Ukraine
began on 24 February 2022.
18.84 So we can clearly see four types
of mission that
18.84 only enhance the drone&;s
capabilities and versatility,
18.84 which is a second argument that underlines
the fact that we do indeed
18.84 seem to have a weapon that
is expanding considerably.
18.84 In this regard, a third aspect should
be added to the first two.
18.84 Yes, because mission diversity goes
hand in hand with
18.84 capability,
words with the number of drones
18.84 available. We know the figures on how
many drones are destroyed daily.
18.84 This spells out a need for a far
18.84 greater
production capacity.
18.84 This concerns the number of drones in
the field, but also the
18.84 number of countries
that can produce them.
18.84 One point
18.84 of reference is the
Drone Databook by Dan Gettinger,
18.84 a researcher who founded a centre
for the study of drones.
18.84 His work spans over 300 pages,
and an initial clue indicates
18.84 that over
102 countries
18.84 have military drones
worldwide today.
18.84 This is remarkable when you realize that
the UN consists of 194 countries.
18.84 Gettinger&;s book proposes
a classification system,
18.84 particularly in relation to drone weight,
and includes many pages
18.84 corresponding to datasheets on
each country, each
18.84 consisting of a unique
description,
18.84 type and quantity
of their equipment.
18.84 This book has a number of
interesting aspects.
18.84 There are apparently over 30,000
military
18.84 drones in use worldwide today,
which is
18.84 already a
daunting number.
18.84 Even more interesting, however,
this number has increased by
18.84 58% over
the last decade.
18.84 Progress in this field has been
substantial.
18.84 In 2019, the overall budget
for military drones was
18.84 roughly
$8.65 billion.
18.84 And in terms of forecasts,
18.84 many consider that this will hit $19
billion by 2027, though
18.84 others even consider that it
will reach $25m or $27m billion,
18.84 or even $30 billion
by 2025.
18.84 All these figures show
18.84 a seemingly vertiginous growth in
the use of drones in terms of
18.84 number of countries involved,
number of drones developed
18.84 and also
the amount of money
18.84 invested in
each of them.
18.84 This has 3 aspects.
18.84 Firstly, the different drone
categories;
18.84 secondly, the
18.84 associated range of missions;
and thirdly, the
18.84 magnitude of production and amount of
money allocated. This all
18.84 seems to lead us towards the
same perception:
18.84 the growing importance
of drones
18.84 on
the battlefield today.
18.84 One question that should be asked
right now is:
18.84 Is
this just a fad?
18.84 Is this just something being put
in place because it corresponds
18.84 in particular to a certain number
of geographical
18.84 topographical situations, or regarding the
identity of the players?
18.84 Or are we dealing with a genuine
underlying dynamic
18.84 that is radically
transforming battlefields
18.84 and therefore obviously risks
geopolitical repercussions?
18.84 Our discussion
is revolving around
18.84 such a question
right now.
18.84 We can attempt to
18.84 answer this question by
breaking it down and
18.84 looking at the aspects for which
we do have an answer.
18.84 We can begin with the question of the
drone and its characteristics.
18.84 Do drones have unique characteristics
18.84 that render them
especially useful?
18.84 I believe that one in particular
manages to bring together or combine
18.84 a certain number of its features
as we can sense almost intuitively.
18.84 I&;m going to use a term that may
18.84 seem positive,
but we should realise that it
18.84 all depends on
how we deploy them.
18.84 Drones let you virtually
overcome all limits.
18.84 Drones let us overcome limits,
firstly, as we can see, in terms
18.84 of geographical confines,
since its aerial use
18.84 means that it can penetrate
the front lines.
18.84 Drones can also overcome borders,
since they are relatively discreet,
18.84 which is what we would like our
audience to notice.
18.84 This relative discretion
ultimately enables drones to cross
18.84 borders and therefore not
respect airspace.
18.84 Drones can thus move around airspace
and across borders quite quickly,
18.84 and also intervene,
completely,
18.84 regardless of the
governments
18.84 or authorities
in place.
18.84 They can thus really break
international law, and even the law
18.84 of the countries
where they are.
18.84 Drones must thus
18.84 overcome a number
of constraints.
18.84 And there are others.
18.84 We can in fact
see them clearly
18.84 in a older book whose title says
it all:
18.84 Hunter Killer:
Inside the Lethal World of Drone Warfare.
18.84 The book was written by US lieutenant
18.84 colonel T. Mark McCurley,
a former pilot who suddenly
18.84 became a drone pilot
for the drones we mentioned
18.84 earlier, now faced with missions
in asymmetric wars,
18.84 but in which the
final mission is to
18.84 physically eliminate a
targeted number
18.84 of
people.
18.84 An interesting book on this is
David Sanger’s Confront and Conceal:
18.84 Obama&;s Secret Wars and Surprising
Use of American Power,
18.84 written in 2012.
18.84 Page 279 contains
a very interesting reflection
18.84 regarding
drones.
18.84 It says that the Obama administration
authorised over 250 secret drone
18.84 strikes and that&;s under Chapter 10, whose title
is quite interesting because
18.84 it&;s actually:
the dark side of the light footprint.
18.84 The light footprint is
supposed to be the footprint of
18.84 the drones, helping to avoid
direct confrontation, but the
18.84 dark side, of course, refers to
the Dark Side of Star Wars.
18.84 There&;s clearly a
wholly immoral side to drones,
18.84 and let&;s be honest,
its reputation has been
18.84 tarnished
pretty quickly.
18.84 We&;ve quickly gone from the ecstasy
of these technological
18.84 capabilities to the fact that they pose
a whole host of moral problems.
18.84 There was also a
18.84 great deal of collateral damage
during these strikes.
18.84 Two countries in particular
come to mind: Pakistan and Yemen.
18.84 In this case, the drone&;s ability
to completely overcome these constraints.
18.84 There&;s a third limit that&;s even
more interesting, it seems to me,
18.84 and that&;s that drone
intervention can be nonstop.
18.84 Because ground crews can replace
18.84 each other and drones, some
have flight capacities longer than
18.84 10,
20 or even 30 hours.
18.84 Having drones enables us to
18.84 constantly pressure our enemies,
thus freeing ourselves. You may recall
18.84 the images
of the First World War when troops
18.84 were sent by rotation
—the famous Verdun route—
18.84 to rest and recover and
then return to combat.
18.84 That&;s no longer possible.
Now drones can penetrate the
18.84 front line and hit
the enemy constantly.
18.84 What&;s more, we&;ve
crossed the line here.
18.84 And what&;s quite interesting,
if I may say so,
18.84 is that it can,
from a technological point of view,
18.84 be dressed up in two
totally different ways.
18.84 The drone is omnipresent
because it is totally silent.
18.84 And so, as you can
see from the various accounts,
18.84 for those who might be interested,
in the books we&;ve already mentioned,
18.84 the enemy
is on constant alert.
18.84 Imagine how stressful
18.84 and exhausting it must be
to keep watch without being totally sure
18.84 that you&;ll be able to anticipate
a strike because it&;s silent.
18.84 Yet there are
also much smaller drone models with
18.84 a constant noise
or buzz,
18.84 without necessarily
being distinguishable.
18.84 And then we&;re totally taken in
by the constant noise.
18.84 We&;re thus dealing with a
18.84 weapon that&;s even overcome
psychological limits.
18.84 There are already intrinsic qualities
clearly optimizing the potential of
18.84 our armies, but that&;s far
from being everything.
18.84 Yes, so we can clearly see
the idea of transgressing all boundaries,
18.84 as well as the psychological impact
this weapon can have.
18.84 Perhaps more concretely,
the drone can also be used to
18.84 replace weapons
that have failed.
18.84 That&;s very important.
18.84 That&;s very important, because it will
help us understand that,
18.84 far from being a fad,
there&;s an exponential effect.
18.84 In this regard,
two essential logics should be
18.84 taken into consideration
in this virtually
18.84 suppletive weapons approach,
if I can call it that.
18.84 There&;s an approach that&;s linked to the
fear of losing fighters.
18.84 There are also approaches
linked to the fact that
18.84 other weapons are
not readily available, since
18.84 they are too expensive,
too few in number and, ultimately,
18.84 create a kind of
apprehension about using them.
18.84 Such as?
First of all, the fear of
18.84 losing fighters is fairly
easy to understand.
18.84 By definition, a drone is
18.84 piloted by someone who
may be several hundred kilometres,
18.84 or even several thousand
kilometres, away.
18.84 A drone loss is a material loss,
and forestalls any loss of human life,
18.84 which is very important in terms of
public sensitivity on limited
18.84 operations, but also very
important in the context of a war,
18.84 because training pilots takes
a long time.
18.84 There&;s a lot of talk about the
fighter jets we&;re sending
18.84 to Ukraine, but the training
time for even
18.84 an experienced
pilot using advanced
18.84 and complex technologies
is extremely long.
18.84 Above and beyond the human aspect and
public sensitivity, there&;s
18.84 the professional aspect of
saying: we might lose
18.84 soldiers, who taken an
enormous amount of time to train.
18.84 But there&;s a second aspect
that&;s even more interesting. Here, we&;re
18.84 dealing with cost.
18.84 Because what I think is important
to stress is
18.84 that in the conflict in Ukraine, the
18.84 Russian air force normally
has air supremacy.
18.84 With the manpower and
18.84 equipment it has at its disposal,
it should be able to assert its
18.84 superiority in the skies,
but it does not.
18.84 Yes, Russia&;s partly stunned by the
18.84 meshing of Ukraine&;s anti-aircraft
defences, but also
18.84 by the fear of losing a number
of important aircraft,
18.84 whose technology and production time
are frightening
18.84 in advance, because the fear
is one of losing a major asset.
18.84 On page 55, two Chinese colonels,
Wang Xiangsui and
18.84 Qiao Liang, wrote a
book in 1999 entitled
18.84 Unrestricted Warfare, which
I think is a very
18.84 interesting reflection on the
relationship between the Americans
18.84 and arms financing.
In this regard,
18.84 in the 1960s-1970s,
the cost of developing an aircraft
18.84 like the F-14 or F-15
was one billion dollars.
18.84 Then, much later in the &;90s, when
we came to the development cost, and strictly
18.84 development cost,
not the production cost, of the
18.84 F-22, this number spikes to $13 billion.
18.84 When we start adapting the reasoning,
18.84 since now we&;re talking
about sums mentioned in 1999,
18.84 so we&;d obviously have to adapt
the sums,
18.84 for the Northrop Bombardier B-2,
what&;s quite surprising is that
18.84 while the F-22 to be produced
today costs more than $100 million,
18.84 the B-2 bomber per unit was
calculated by the Chinese in &;99
18.84 at over $15 billion
per unit.
18.84 Today, this sum is about $3–4 billion
if you count depreciation, but if you
18.84 add up the research,
development
18.84 and study flights, the Chinese came to
the rather piquant conclusion that,
18.84 in fact, for each B2 produced,
the Americans spend
18.84 three times
its weight in gold.
18.84 So, in fact, we&;re faced
18.84 with a situation where these weapons
are remarkable, except that in
18.84 fact we&;re gripped by the dread of
losing such fundamental pieces.
18.84 There&;s a kind of inhibition
18.84 to using them, and somewhere out
there, drones are
18.84 making it possible not only
to overcome this constraint, but
18.84 also to return to the logic of
density in terms of the use
18.84 of equipment to saturate
enemy defences.
18.84 As you can see,
the first stage of our approach focused
18.84 on the drone&;s intrinsic
characteristics.
18.84 But then, in the second stage of our
approach, the drone will also
18.84 be able to compensate for
shortcomings or
18.84 problems such as we were confronted
with on the battlefield.
18.84 And that&;s not all.
18.84 Yes, since here we&;re looking at
armies almost generically.
18.84 Yet a more detailed look shows
that the different components of the
18.84 army are all interested in drones
and want to use them.
18.84 We&;re in the process
of widening the scope of our prism,
18.84 and that&;s
important, given our problem.
18.84 Because here, if we broaden the scope,
we notice one thing: when weapons
18.84 are major, they
become issues of power.
18.84 There&;s something very
important to remember here.
18.84 We did this in one of our previous
18.84 sessions, which was dedicated
to military issues.
18.84 We already mentioned that
each army is
18.84 subdivided into three
main branches.
18.84 There are more,
including the army,
18.84 navy and
air force.
18.84 And so, one interesting point that
Seth Frantzman makes is that,
18.84 in reality, he shows that the
US Army, US Navy
18.84 and US Air Force are
vying fiercely to gain
18.84 the favours of
drone programme development,
18.84 to secure a majority of
drone programmes, and
18.84 even monopolise
the programme.
18.84 Hollywood also has drones in its claws.
18.84 Hollywood is appropriating it in
films and TV series.
18.84 Take the 2014 film, Good Kill,
18.84 for instance, the
plot deals with drones.
18.84 How about a series as famous and
renowned as "Homeland",
18.84 whose first episode of
season 4,
18.84 which is attached to the
18.84 main heroine, is titled
the Drone Queen.
18.84 Here, the importance of
the drone has reached such
18.84 a level that it&;s
outstripping even the Army, Navy
18.84 and US Air Force staffs mentioned, and has
now gone full-on Hollywood.
18.84 Jean-Michel Valantin had already made this point
in a book written
18.84 for Editions Autrement in 2010 called
Hollywood, le pentagone et
18.84 le monde (Hollywood, the
Pentagon and the World),
18.84 uncovering an internecine
quarrel within
18.84 the US military over who
would have the major share, or even
18.84 the monopoly, of the
use of nuclear weapons.
18.84 Here, we&;re putting into
18.84 perspective two dynamics which,
through their intermediaries,
18.84 place the drone on an almost equal
footing with nuclear weapons.
18.84 By the way, if I may add
something in this regard, which
18.84 I sometimes explain to students in class,
18.84 what&;s quite interesting
about these films from that period
18.84 is that we clearly have
3 films that are symbols, respectively,
18.84 of the US army, the navy and, if you think
about it, the air force.
18.84 Because Rambo II is
about the fact that we can&;t win a
18.84 war if we don&;t have the courage
to get involved on the ground.
18.84 I almost want to say in
the clay or in the earth,
18.84 Sartre in dirty hands,
you really have to get down to it.
18.84 That&;s Rambo II.
18.84 It&;s clear, which we can say
with a little detached pleasure in 2023,
18.84 as Top Gun, especially the first one,
is still a panegyric on the US naval
18.84 air forces, which I remind you are
18.84 members of the American army
and show that nothing
18.84 can be done without
them, because they are able to
18.84 project themselves anywhere in
the world,
18.84 more or less elegantly.
18.84 And then, perhaps more
surprisingly independently,
18.84 we have Independence Day, where it&;s
clear that the US Air Force says
18.84 &;Our two colleague services
are very interesting,
18.84 but in the end, the US Air Force,
we&;re the ones in control,
18.84 because by definition,
as soon as we&;re dealing with
18.84 something major, we&;re the ones
called in&;.
18.84 So we already had this confrontation,
18.84 which shows the importance
of this rivalry.
18.84 Here we have three characters.
18.84 The intrinsic characteristics of the weapon, its
18.84 ability to offset the shortcomings
of other weapons, and then we have the
18.84 craze, which is proof that we are
indeed dealing with an upheaval of
18.84 the battlefield, which we can imagine will
itself be a source of
18.84 upheaval in terms of
geopolitical equilibrium.
18.84 Yes, because if you add up all these
18.84 dimensions, you can
see that the drone is here
18.84 to make its mark on
the landscape, and that a greater number
18.84 of players have
taken possession of it.
18.84 Which geopolitical logics in
particular will be shaken up?
18.84 If we want to understand
the geopolitical upheavals
18.84 we&;re seeing or guessing,
I think that beyond the
18.84 three traditional countries that
first come to mind in
18.84 producing drones, namely
the United States, China and Israel,
18.84 there are two new players who are
emerging; well,
18.84 two new players in the last ten years or so.
They appear to
18.84 be very important.
18.84 First, there&;s Iran.
18.84 There&;s one drone, the Shahed 136, which is gaining
a very important reputation in the Ukrainian conflict,
18.84 as the Iranians are
supplying Russia with drones.
18.84 That fact is quite
interesting in itself.
18.84 Iran supplies drones
to Russia.
18.84 With a wingspan of around two metres
at delta L, the drone is quite slow.
18.84 With a top speed
of 180 km/h, it&;s a kamikaze drone that
18.84 has a saturation effect,
pounding enemy defences and targets,
18.84 and in fact
monopolising a number of
18.84 Ukrainian
anti-aircraft defences.
18.84 Once you&;ve seen it,
18.84 it&;s pretty easy to shoot down,
but the problem is
18.84 that it&;s very difficult to detect
in radar terms, and following on from
18.84 what we said earlier,
the Ukrainian soldiers have nicknamed it
18.84 the "moped",
because in fact it
18.84 has a sort
of double-cycle engine.
18.84 It&;s quite interesting to imagine
the psychological sensation you
18.84 must have when you start to
perceive a cell phone noise
18.84 that you can&;t hear
in the street.
18.84 That&;s the drone.
18.84 But that&;s not all.
18.84 There&;s also the Mohajer-6,
18.84 an observation drone that the
Iranians supply to the Russians.
18.84 What&;s very important
information to have is that
18.84 apparently, according to US intelligence
studies, the Iranians are
18.84 squarely in the process of building
a drone manufacturing plant in
18.84 Russia, which would
be ready by early 2024.
18.84 Here, we&;re much more
than just supplying drones,
18.84 we&;re able to supply production
lines to a customer.
18.84 But there&;s one player that I think is
unavoidable to mention,
18.84 to highlight, and who,
it seems to me, is unquestionably
18.84 the main player in the
drone market, and that&;s Turkey.
18.84 There are three aspects that seem
to me to be important to put in place
18.84 to support the fact that Turkey
is really the country truly on the
18.84 rise, mainly because
of drones and, it seems to me,
18.84 once again,
in a totally undeniable way.
18.84 First, the operational
success.
18.84 Let&;s not forget that Turkish drones
18.84 were certainly a major factor in
Azerbaijan&;s success in the
18.84 Nagorno-Karabakh war against
Armenia in the second half of 2020,
18.84 and that there
have been other precedents.
18.84 There were three interventions by
Turkish armed forces in northern Syria.
18.84 There also was undeniable victories
18.84 of the side Turkey aided in
the civil war in
18.84 Libya in 2020, and a UN report said
that Turkish drone
18.84 interventions were the main factor
that changed the balance of power
18.84 between the
belligerents in Libya.
18.84 Turning to the war in Ukraine,
18.84 Turkey&;s Bayraktar TB2 has
become more than just a symbol.
18.84 It&;s become almost a kind of iconic totem,
because the
18.84 Turks have supplied the Bayraktar TB2,
a combat drone with
18.84 a range of over 27 hours that
can attack the enemy.
18.84 The Ukrainians liked it so much
that they made a
18.84 music video featuring
a chorus repeating the
18.84 drone&;s name &;Bayraktar&;
in an
18.84 wholly
lyrical style.
18.84 The drone obviously enchants
the battlefield, and the Turks
18.84 are clearly
playing a decisive role.
18.84 In fact, one thing we can&;t fail to
notice is that they&;re
18.84 having a genuine
operational success.
18.84 They&;re reputation
is now worldwide.
18.84 But what&;s interesting to note is that
beyond this technical performance,
18.84 which today puts them ahead
of the Chinese drones,
18.84 there&;s another performance that&;s
interesting about
18.84 the Turkish drones, and that&;s
that they&;re
18.84 much cheaper, and this
resonates with what we said
18.84 before, compared with
American
18.84 and
Israeli drones.
18.84 And if we look closely,
Turkey, in addition to serving
18.84 the Ukraine, has Morocco,
Qatar,
18.84 Poland and Romania as customers,
which means that Turkey
18.84 is now supplying
drones to NATO countries.
18.84 And the same questions, a priori,
18.84 even if not confirmed by either
Ethiopia or Turkey,
18.84 Turkey is sending
drone programmes to Ethiopia.
18.84 It&;s quite interesting, because it&;s
18.84 clear that even if it remains
a secret, it&;s a reflection of
18.84 the importance that
drones are acquiring.
18.84 And
there&;s a third important
18.84 parameter to highlight, and that&;s
the fact
18.84 that this technological performance is
increasing all the time.
18.84 Because the Turks have developed
18.84 a new Bayraktar version and
alongside this new model, Bayraktar is
18.84 now capable of carrying
additional weapons.
18.84 They have additional drones: Anka
and Karayel. However, on
18.84 10 April 2023,
Turkey President
18.84 Erdoğan
inaugurated a
18.84 32-metre-long
drone carrier.
18.84 You can imagine the
exceptional technology involved.
18.84 The Anadolu, the most important
ship in the Turkish navy.
18.84 We can thus understand how
18.84 Turkey and Iran are in
the process of acquiring far greater
18.84 military power than in the past,
thanks to this drone which,
18.84 by turning battlefields upside down,
with the advent of these powers
18.84 that have mastered the technology,
is bound to bring about
18.84 upheavals in the
geopolitical balance.
18.84 Yes, because we could ask ourselves if
18.84 this is just an opportune moment,
or is this a major trend
18.84 that is set to accelerate
and become more pronounced?
18.84 There are two aspects which,
it seems to me, will reinforce
18.84 this dynamic, or which may
tend to reinforce it.
18.84 There&;s a tactical aspect
and also a technological aspect.
18.84 The tactical aspect is easy enough
18.84 to state, but should not
be underestimated.
18.84 The tactical aspect
18.84 is what the military staffs will be able
to do with this new weapon,
18.84 which clearly offers them
unrivalled possibilities.
18.84 And here there&;s a comparison to be
made with the tank, which
18.84 was still in its infancy at the end
of the First World War, and which,
18.84 at the end of that war,
18.84 was the subject of
major doctrinal debates.
18.84 Some names immediately are called
to mind.
18.84 Liddell Hart,
to whom we dedicated a session,
18.84 John Fuller, colonel and later general
Charles de Gaulle and Heinz Guderian.
18.84 And it&;s easy to see that all
their reflections
18.84 and tactical revolutions
will lead to an upheaval on
18.84 the battlefield, which will in fact lead
to mobility and,
18.84 to put it bluntly, blitzkrieg.
18.84 And totally change what
we thought was definitively in
18.84 place with the wars of
position in &;14-18.
18.84 This is important when you remember that
18.84 there are wars of position
in Ukraine today.
18.84 In this regard, general staffs
will play a decisive role.
18.84 Let&;s not forget technological advances.
We may first
18.84 think of speed,
especially with all the talk of
18.84 hypersonic speeds on missiles
or cruise
18.84 missiles,
18.84 or of acquiring
new dimensions.
18.84 In late 2022,
the Ukrainians developed maritime
18.84 drones to attack Russian ships,
so we&;d have drones
18.84 entering a
new dimension.
18.84 These two technologies are interesting,
18.84 but I think there&;s another that will
exponentially amplify the drone&;s
18.84 leading role
as it now has.
18.84 Is that the technological parameter?
18.84 That&;s the technological parameter.
18.84 What is this
technological parameter?
18.84 Artificial intelligence.
18.84 Imagine an artificial intelligence
developed with a weapon that
18.84 breaks all limits
and is versatile.
18.84 In fact, a drone
with artificial intelligence with
18.84 no limits in terms of
borders or
18.84 routes. A drone that can change
at will from the route as prefigured to
18.84 avoid defence measures,
which means that
18.84 in reality,
even those who send it no longer know
18.84 what route it is taking and it can make
its own decision as to whether or
18.84 not to eliminate the target
it has in front of it.
18.84 In fact, the drone is the perfect armed
extension of artificial intelligence.
18.84 We might even say that
it&;s the strong arm.
18.84 Since the nuclear weapon,
has it been
18.84 possible, in terms of conventional
weapons, to develop a weapon
18.84 with such high potential for mankind,
and to put it to military use?
18.84 There&;s an upheaval.
18.84 Upheaval on the battlefield and
18.84 upheaval in
geopolitical balances.
18.84 And in fact,
this upheaval has already begun.
18.84 Fabrice, I think we&;ve rarely
18.84 had such a clear and firm
conclusion to the question.
18.84 Thank you.
18.84 Thank you.
18.84 We&;ve reached the end of this
18.84 latest session of
Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique.
18.84 Thank you everyone for
for following us.
.