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La durée (00:17:55s), le titre (Ukrainian Drones STRIKE Russian Train – Then THIS Happened…) et les informations de l’auteur sont des détails importants à considérer, tout comme la description :« Le 23 juillet 2025, à 10 h 18, quatre drones ukrainiens FPV ont lancé l’une des frappes de drones à longue portée les plus audacieuses de la guerre, ciblant un train de carburant russe à 35 kilomètres derrière les lignes de front. Ce qui a suivi était une masterclass sur le relais de signaux, les tactiques anti-brouillage et la précision des vols à basse altitude. Des relais de drones répéteurs abattus par les MANPADS russes Verba au vol à l’aveugle en passant par le brouillage électromagnétique des systèmes Zhitel et Pole-21, cette opération a testé toutes les limites de la guerre des drones. Les forces ukrainiennes s’étaient préparées à toutes les éventualités : des leurres pour confondre les systèmes de missiles Pantsir-S1, des exercices de simulation pour voler sans GPS et des chaînes de signaux de secours pour naviguer dans le gant électronique. Le résultat ? Onze camions-citernes ont été détruits, 660 000 litres de carburant ont été perdus et des conduites d’approvisionnement russes critiques ont été paralysées pendant 72 heures. Cette vidéo détaille chaque phase de l’opération, depuis l’attaque FPV de l’unité Ronin jusqu’au soutien coordonné de l’unité Alpha ukrainienne, de Kaboul 9 et du groupe Next. Les frappes en zone arrière ont changé pour toujours. #ukraine #russie #beyondmilitary Crédits : https://sites.google.com/ytmgltd.com/ukrainian-drones-strike-ru/home ».

Grâce à ses fonctionnalités avancées, youtube permet aux utilisateurs d’accéder à un large éventail de contenus tout en garantissant sécurité et confidentialité.

Les drones sont utilisés de multiples façons dans les conflits armés.

Des drones civils exploités dans un contexte militaire

Certains drones grand public, en particulier ceux de la marque DJI (comme le Mavic ou le Phantom), sont souvent employés pour des missions de reconnaissance ou même d’attaque. Ces drones deviennent des bombardiers de fortune lorsque des charges explosives y sont fixées par les combattants.

La simplicité d’utilisation et la performance des caméras intégrées les rendent indispensables pour le renseignement et la direction des tirs d’artillerie. Ces drones, cependant, peuvent souvent être affectés par des contre-mesures électroniques, comme le brouillage ou le piratage.

Les drones militaires : un progrès sans précédent dans la guerre d’aujourd’hui

La stratégie militaire a été redéfinie par l’essor des drones. Les grandes puissances militaires innovent avec des modèles de plus en plus performants, qui peuvent réaliser des missions de reconnaissance, de frappe et de soutien aux troupes au sol.

Le MQ-9 Reaper est un drone de combat américain qui sert à réaliser des frappes de précision. Dans divers conflits récents, le Bayraktar TB2, un drone turc, a joué un rôle important, notamment en Ukraine et au Haut-Karabakh. Le Shahed-136 est un drone kamikaze iranien qui est largement utilisé dans les conflits au Moyen-Orient et en Europe de l’Est.

Grâce à ces appareils, les armées peuvent frapper des cibles éloignées avec une précision remarquable, minimisant ainsi les dangers pour les pilotes humains.

Les drones FPV et kamikazes se développent rapidement

L’utilisation des drones FPV (First Person View) adaptés pour le transport d’explosifs est une évolution marquante de ces dernières années. En immersion, ces petits drones, souvent dérivés de modèles civils adaptés, sont massivement utilisés en Ukraine grâce à des lunettes de réalité virtuelle. En raison de leur coût réduit et de leur efficacité, ils sont des armes redoutables pour les opérations tactiques.

Ces appareils volants sont fréquemment abandonnés après l’assaut, étant donné qu’ils sont fabriqués pour servir d’armes jetables. La facilité d’utilisation permet aux militaires sans compétences en pilotage avancé de les utiliser sur le terrain.

La place des drones dans les stratégies militaires futures

L’évolution technologique rapide ouvre la voie à un futur où les drones seront encore plus intégrés dans notre quotidien. On note l’arrivée de drones autonomes, intégrant une intelligence artificielle, qui peuvent prendre des décisions sans l’intervention d’un humain.

Les essaims de drones, composés de centaines d’unités travaillant en harmonie, pourraient redéfinir les tactiques militaires. De surcroît, la diminution de la taille des technologies pourrait faciliter la conception de drones de plus en plus compacts et discrets, rendant leur détection et leur neutralisation plus difficiles.

Les pilotes de drones, héros de guerre, émergent

Une nouvelle espèce de combattants est née avec l’augmentation de l’usage des drones : les pilotes de drones de guerre. Ces opérateurs, souvent éloignés de plusieurs milliers de kilomètres du champ de bataille, sont essentiels au succès des opérations militaires.

Des pilotes deviennent de véritables héros, réalisant un grand nombre de frappes efficaces et modifiant l’issue des affrontements. Dans les conflits récents, le courage ne se mesure plus uniquement sur le champ de bataille, mais également dans la stratégie et l’expertise des pilotes de drones.

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#Ukrainian #Drones #STRIKE #Russian #Train #Happened

Retranscription des paroles de la vidéo: The explosion could be seen for 15 km. Black smoke rising 100 m into the sky. 660,000 L of fuel gone. But what makes this different from every other strike you’ve seen? Distance. This Russian train was 35 km behind enemy lines, protected by systems that should have made it untouchable. Four Ukrainian pilots were about to prove that nowhere is safe anymore. And they’re going to do it with drones that cost less than your laptop. 35 km away, operators from Ukraine’s elite Ronin unit monitor degraded video feeds through analog transmitters that shouldn’t work at this range. Four FPV quadcopters push through distances that every military manual says are impossible. Standard drones give out at 3 kilometers, but these are already at 15 and climbing. Behind them, Cobble 9 intelligence feeds real-time updates while Alpha unit intercepts Russian communications. The next group’s counter jamming equipment stands ready to burn holes right through the electromagnetic interference when needed. Suddenly, the video feed on the operator screen turned to static. Without warning, the attack drone is now blind. Its signal to the operator has just been severed. The first repeater drone, the critical relay link that made this 35 km mission possible, had just been destroyed. A Russian Verba man pads operator had scored a hit on the repeater hovering at 500 m. And without it, the attack drones couldn’t receive commands. The entire mission was seconds from failure. This is the challenge of extreme range drone operations. Ukrainian forces use analog 5.8 8 GHz video transmission because it has zero latency. Digital signals would be easier to extend, but they have a 200 millisecond delay that makes precision strikes impossible. When you’re flying at 80 kmh toward a moving train, 200 milliseconds means missing by 5 m. So, Ukraine stuck with analog, even though it meant needing these vulnerable repeater drones positioned every 5 km. The Ronin unit operator watched his screen, waiting 3 seconds, 5 seconds. Then the backup repeater came online. This drone had been flying lower at just 200 m, which was harder for the Verba to detect, but 2 km off the optimal position. The signal strength dropped to 60%, making the video grainy, but it was enough. The backup repeater was now the critical link in a chain stretching toward the Russian fuel train carrying 660,000 L of diesel and aviation fuel. This wasn’t just the Ronin unit operating alone. The mission involved four specialized groups working in perfect coordination. Kbble 9, Ukraine’s defense intelligence unit, had been tracking this specific train for weeks, learning its schedule and fuel car configuration. The security services alpha unit provided electronic overwatch monitoring Russian communications for any sign they’d been detected. The state special communications service next group stood ready with their counter jamming equipment. Each unit had a specific role. Ronin flew the attack drones. Cabbell 9 provided real-time intelligence updates. Alpha intercepted Russian responses and next would burn holes through the jamming when needed. The backup repeater strategy was deliberate. Ukrainian forces always deploy three repeaters per chain with two backups flying at different altitudes. The primary hovers at 500 m for optimal signal propagation. The first backup stays at 200 m, harder to detect, but with reduced range. The second backup skims at just 100 m, nearly invisible to air defense, but only useful as a last resort. They maintain a 2 km spacing to prevent multiple losses from a single missile. Ronin operators train for exactly this scenario. Each pilot logs over 200 hours in simulators flying with degraded signals, learning to use railroad tracks, rivers, and power lines as navigation references when video quality drops. They practice flying blind for up to 30 seconds using mental timing and memorized terrain to maintain course. Count to 15. Slight right to follow the tracks. Count to 10. Pull up for the power lines. These mantras keep drones flying when technology fails. The Russians knew Ukrainian drones were coming. They always knew. The question was whether their defense systems could stop them. In the distance, the fuel train continued rolling at 40 kmh. Unaware that four FPV drones were now converging on its position. The lead drone had 20 km to go. What came next would determine if Ukraine’s gamble would pay off or if four drones would go down in Russia airspace for nothing. But as the lead drone pushed deeper into enemy territory. At the 25 km mark, the drone entered an electromagnetic nightmare. The video feed didn’t just degrade, it turned into pure chaos. Random pixels rolling static and then nothing. The drone had just entered the engagement zone of the weapon system you see here. This is called the Russian R330 ZHz electronic warfare system. This truckmounted jammer can flood the electromagnetic spectrum from 100 to 2,000 MHz, creating a 15 km bubble where nothing gets through. At least that’s the theory. The operator immediately initiated frequency hopping, 40 channels per second, searching for gaps in the Russian jamming. The R330Z is powerful, but it can’t cover every frequency simultaneously with full power. There are dead zones, tiny gaps that last milliseconds. The Ukrainian operators had learned to find them. The frequency patterns weren’t random. The Ronin unit had pre-programmed sequences based on dozens of previous missions. They’d learned that Russian jammers typically focus power on common FPB frequencies, 5.8, 2.4, and 1.2 GHz. But there are gaps in other frequencies that the Russians often miss. The operator’s frequency hopping followed a specific pattern. Three hops on common bands to confuse Russian operators, then a quick jump to a gap frequency for 2 seconds of clear audio, then back to hopping. It’s a dance that Ukrainian pilots have perfected through painful trial and error. For 15 agonizing seconds, the drone flew blind. The GPS showed the drone’s position as 10 km away from where it actually was. The Russians were spoofing satellite signals, too. But Ukrainian pilots trained for this, hours in simulators, flying by mental maps, counting seconds to estimate distance, using the sun and moon’s positions for direction when everything else fails. Behind the lead drone, three more FPV drones followed at precisely 30-second intervals. This spacing was crucial. If they flew too close together, Russian jamming could catch all four simultaneously. Too far apart, and the lead drones pathf finding through the jamming wouldn’t help the others. 30 seconds meant each drone could follow the successful frequency pattern of the leader while the Russians were still adjusting their jammers. The second drone was already entering the jamming zone, its operator watching the lead drone’s frequency hops and copying them exactly. Then the breakthrough they needed, the Ukrainian next group activated its counter EW system. This isn’t subtle. It’s electronic warfare brute force. The powerful directional transmission that burns a hole through the jamming. But it comes with a cost. For 30 seconds, the Ukrainian position lights up on every Russian detection system like a lighthouse in the dark. The 30-second exposure window was a calculated risk. Ukrainian intelligence knew Russian artillery response time averaged 45 seconds from detection to first shell, but 30 seconds of clear signal at a time could push the drones through 10 km of heavily jammed airspace. Next group operators had their hands on the power switch, watching the clock. At 28 seconds, they cut transmission and relocate, giving them a 17-second safety margin. Three previous missions had validated this timing. Aggressive enough to be effective, but conservative enough to survive. The video feed returned, fuzzy, but functional. Through the static, the operator could see the railroad tracks below. The drone was now following them at just 50 m altitude, using the steel rails as a navigation guide that no amount of GPS spoofing could hide. But the R330Z was just the first layer. As the drone pushed forward, the Russians were readying new equipment. The operators switched to manual control, abandoning any hope of GPS navigation. From here on, it would be pure visual flying through degraded video. The fuel train was now 10 km away, and Russian operators were frantically working to vector their air defenses onto the incoming threat. Russian commanders were about to learn a lesson that turned one of their most advanced detection systems into Ukraine’s greatest advantage. The Kasuka 4 system detected them first. This massive electronic warfare vehicle can spot drone control signals at 150 km and now it has a solid track on the incoming threats. The Russian operator immediately vetoed a Pancer S1 air defense system to intercept. The Pancer’s radar locked onto the lead drone and its automated systems calculated an intercept solution. 8 seconds to missile launch. But the Ukrainians had anticipated this. Suddenly, six new contacts appeared on the Russian screens. Decoy drones costing just $200 each were equipped with corner reflectors that made them look much larger than threats on radar. The pancer’s targeting computer couldn’t tell the difference between a $200 decoy and a $3,000 attack drone carrying military ordinance. The Russian operator had to make a choice. Engage all targets and risk running out of missiles or try to identify the real threats and risk letting them through. He chose to engage. The Pancer’s launcher elevated and missiles started streaking into the sky, but only four of the six decoys activated properly. Two real drones were still exposed. Four of six decoys worked better than usual. Keep in mind, these are garagebuilt from racing drone parts and energy drink cans. Cold weather drains batteries, jamming fry circuits, but even four was enough. The pancer just wasted eight of 12 missiles on garbage worth less than a laptop. Previous Ukrainian attacks sent 20 decoys just to empty Russian magazines. Now, the Pancer had four missiles left and a 20inute reload time. Despite being nearly out of missiles, it still had its two 30 mm autoc cannons. This is where terrain masking saved the mission. The real attack drones drop just to 10 m altitude, literally skimming the grass. The Pancer S1 has a minimum engagement altitude of 15 m. Anything lower and its radar can’t separate the target from ground clutter. The drones were threading the needle between being too high and getting shot or too low and crashing into obstacles. Flying at grass level meant dodging something every second. Power lines cross the terrain every few hundred meters, invisible until the last moment through degraded video. Trees appear suddenly in the static. Even large birds become lethal obstacles at 80 km hour. Ronin pilots memorized terrain using satellite photos, creating mental maps of every power line, every tree line, every rise that could hide obstacles. They practice specific routes dozens of times in simulators, learning to climb 3 m for the power lines at kilometer 27, then to bank left to avoid the radio tower at kilometer 29. Meanwhile, the Russian Kasuka 4 was still tracking the control signals, but it had a different problem. It could detect the analog video feeds but couldn’t jam them effectively. Analog signals degrade gracefully. Even with 80% interference, you still get 20% picture. Digital signals would be completely blocked, but they’d also be useless for precision strikes at this range. 4 km from the target now, and the train had received a warning of incoming drones. The locomotive’s whistle shrieked as the engineer pushed the throttle forward, trying to accelerate. A moving train at 40 km per hour is exponentially harder to hit than a stationary target. The hit probability drops from 90% to just 30%. But the Ukrainians had planned for this, too. Through the degraded video feed, the operator would see the smoke from the locomotive stack. The train was accelerating, but it would need time to reach full speed. Time it didn’t have. The lead drone was now 3 km out, screaming towards its target at 80 kmh. The next 120 seconds would end with either burning drones or a burning train. 2 km from impact, the final layer of Russian defenses activated. The Pole 21 jammer mounted on the train itself powered up, creating an electromagnetic bubble designed to fry any drones navigation systems. GPS signals vanished instantly. Glonus disappeared. Even the magnetic compass went haywire. But the video feed, that degraded static field analog video, kept coming through. The Ukrainians are now flying purely by visual reference through a screen that looked like a 1980s television with bad reception. They could see the railroad tracks below, using them like a highway leading straight to the target. The train was picking up speed, now doing 45 kmh and accelerating. The first operator started counting cars through the static. Seven. Six. Five. The lead fuel car was the priority target. Hit that and the fire would spread backward through the train. Miss it and the locomotive might decouple the undamaged cars and escape with most of the fuel. He marked his target mentally. The third car behind the locomotive. At 500 m, the video started breaking up completely. The Pole 21 was winning, overwhelming even the analog signal with raw electromagnetic noise. The Ukrainians were essentially blind, flying on memory and trained instinct. 3 seconds to impact. 2 seconds. 1. At 10:32 a.m., the first drone slammed into the lead fuel tanker. The RPG7 warhead detonated on impact. It shaped charge, punching through the steel wall and spraying molten copper into 60,000 L of diesel fuel. The explosion was immediate and catastrophic. A fireball erupted from the car and the train’s emergency brakes automatically engaged, bringing the entire convoy to a screeching halt. But this was just the beginning. 30 seconds behind the leader, the second drone was already in its terminal dive. The massive smoke plume from the first strike should have made targeting impossible, but the operator used the railroad tracks as his guide, counting the seconds to estimate distance. The second drone hit the fourth car, ensuring the fire would spread along the entire length of the train. The third drone arrived 30 seconds later, its operator facing a wall of black smoke and flame. The thermal cameras were overwhelmed entirely, showing nothing but white hot interference. But he knew exactly where the seventh car would be. They’d studied this train configuration for days. Flying blind through the smoke, the drone emerged just 50 m from its target. The operator had 1 second to adjust. The drone struck dead center. The fourth and final drone had the hardest job. The entire train was now an inferno with flames reaching 100 m into the sky. But one fuel car at the rear remained intact. and leaving it would mean leaving salvageable fuel for the Russians. He pushed forward into the black cloud, counting down from his last visual reference. 3 2 1. At 10, 19, and 30 seconds, the fourth drone found its mark. The final fuel car erupted, completing the destruction. All 11 tankers were now burning. 660,000 L of fuel, creating a fire that would burn for 6 hours. The railroad tracks beneath were already warping from the heat, the concrete ties cracking and crumbling. This vital supply line would be unusable for at least 72 hours. Four drones costing a total of $12,000 had just destroyed $3 million worth of fuel and infrastructure. But more importantly, they proven that nowhere in occupied territory was safe from Ukrainian strikes. The age of impunity for rear area supply lines is over. If Ukrainian drones reach 35 km today, Russian logistics officers are doing the math. Tomorrow it could be 50. Next week 100. No train, no depot, no bridge is safe. And Ukraine has thousands more drones ready to go right now. Bye for now. .

Déroulement de la vidéo:

0.48 The explosion could be seen for 15 km.
3.919 Black smoke rising 100 m into the sky.
7.52 660,000
9.12 L of fuel gone. But what makes this
12.639 different from every other strike you’ve
14.639 seen? Distance. This Russian train was
17.92 35 km behind enemy lines, protected by
21.6 systems that should have made it
23.199 untouchable. Four Ukrainian pilots were
26.0 about to prove that nowhere is safe
28.16 anymore. And they’re going to do it with
30.56 drones that cost less than your laptop.
34.0 35 km away, operators from Ukraine’s
37.28 elite Ronin unit monitor degraded video
40.079 feeds through analog transmitters that
42.559 shouldn’t work at this range. Four FPV
45.92 quadcopters push through distances that
48.239 every military manual says are
50.399 impossible. Standard drones give out at
52.879 3 kilometers, but these are already at
55.68 15 and climbing. Behind them, Cobble 9
58.879 intelligence feeds real-time updates
60.96 while Alpha unit intercepts Russian
63.12 communications. The next group’s counter
65.519 jamming equipment stands ready to burn
67.68 holes right through the electromagnetic
69.92 interference when needed. Suddenly, the
72.56 video feed on the operator screen turned
74.72 to static. Without warning, the attack
76.96 drone is now blind. Its signal to the
79.52 operator has just been severed. The
81.92 first repeater drone, the critical relay
84.24 link that made this 35 km mission
86.72 possible, had just been destroyed. A
89.52 Russian Verba man pads operator had
91.92 scored a hit on the repeater hovering at
94.159 500 m. And without it, the attack drones
97.28 couldn’t receive commands. The entire
99.36 mission was seconds from failure. This
102.079 is the challenge of extreme range drone
104.24 operations. Ukrainian forces use analog
107.36 5.8 8 GHz video transmission because it
110.399 has zero latency. Digital signals would
113.04 be easier to extend, but they have a 200
115.84 millisecond delay that makes precision
118.159 strikes impossible. When you’re flying
120.399 at 80 kmh toward a moving train, 200
124.079 milliseconds means missing by 5 m. So,
127.04 Ukraine stuck with analog, even though
129.52 it meant needing these vulnerable
131.52 repeater drones positioned every 5 km.
134.879 The Ronin unit operator watched his
137.2 screen, waiting 3 seconds, 5 seconds.
141.28 Then the backup repeater came online.
143.76 This drone had been flying lower at just
145.84 200 m, which was harder for the Verba to
148.48 detect, but 2 km off the optimal
151.2 position. The signal strength dropped to
153.519 60%, making the video grainy, but it was
156.56 enough. The backup repeater was now the
159.04 critical link in a chain stretching
160.959 toward the Russian fuel train carrying
163.04 660,000
164.64 L of diesel and aviation fuel. This
167.519 wasn’t just the Ronin unit operating
169.68 alone. The mission involved four
172.0 specialized groups working in perfect
174.16 coordination. Kbble 9, Ukraine’s defense
177.36 intelligence unit, had been tracking
179.28 this specific train for weeks, learning
181.68 its schedule and fuel car configuration.
184.239 The security services alpha unit
186.4 provided electronic overwatch monitoring
189.12 Russian communications for any sign
191.36 they’d been detected. The state special
193.68 communications service next group stood
196.0 ready with their counter jamming
197.44 equipment. Each unit had a specific
199.84 role. Ronin flew the attack drones.
202.319 Cabbell 9 provided real-time
204.239 intelligence updates. Alpha intercepted
206.879 Russian responses and next would burn
209.36 holes through the jamming when needed.
211.599 The backup repeater strategy was
213.599 deliberate. Ukrainian forces always
215.92 deploy three repeaters per chain with
218.319 two backups flying at different
219.92 altitudes. The primary hovers at 500 m
223.2 for optimal signal propagation. The
225.44 first backup stays at 200 m, harder to
228.319 detect, but with reduced range. The
230.879 second backup skims at just 100 m,
233.599 nearly invisible to air defense, but
236.0 only useful as a last resort. They
238.4 maintain a 2 km spacing to prevent
240.799 multiple losses from a single missile.
243.12 Ronin operators train for exactly this
245.68 scenario. Each pilot logs over 200 hours
248.879 in simulators flying with degraded
251.12 signals, learning to use railroad
253.28 tracks, rivers, and power lines as
256.16 navigation references when video quality
258.88 drops. They practice flying blind for up
261.759 to 30 seconds using mental timing and
264.479 memorized terrain to maintain course.
266.96 Count to 15. Slight right to follow the
269.68 tracks. Count to 10. Pull up for the
272.16 power lines. These mantras keep drones
274.479 flying when technology fails. The
277.12 Russians knew Ukrainian drones were
279.199 coming. They always knew. The question
281.52 was whether their defense systems could
283.6 stop them. In the distance, the fuel
285.84 train continued rolling at 40 kmh.
288.72 Unaware that four FPV drones were now
291.6 converging on its position. The lead
293.919 drone had 20 km to go. What came next
296.88 would determine if Ukraine’s gamble
298.8 would pay off or if four drones would go
301.44 down in Russia airspace for nothing. But
304.0 as the lead drone pushed deeper into
306.0 enemy territory. At the 25 km mark, the
309.28 drone entered an electromagnetic
311.28 nightmare. The video feed didn’t just
313.52 degrade, it turned into pure chaos.
316.479 Random pixels rolling static and then
319.28 nothing. The drone had just entered the
321.44 engagement zone of the weapon system you
323.6 see here. This is called the Russian
325.759 R330 ZHz electronic warfare system. This
330.4 truckmounted jammer can flood the
332.24 electromagnetic spectrum from 100 to
334.96 2,000 MHz, creating a 15 km bubble where
338.88 nothing gets through. At least that’s
341.199 the theory. The operator immediately
343.84 initiated frequency hopping, 40 channels
346.32 per second, searching for gaps in the
348.24 Russian jamming. The R330Z is powerful,
351.759 but it can’t cover every frequency
353.759 simultaneously with full power. There
356.16 are dead zones, tiny gaps that last
358.479 milliseconds. The Ukrainian operators
360.72 had learned to find them. The frequency
363.12 patterns weren’t random. The Ronin unit
365.36 had pre-programmed sequences based on
367.6 dozens of previous missions. They’d
369.68 learned that Russian jammers typically
371.52 focus power on common FPB frequencies,
374.56 5.8, 2.4, and 1.2 GHz. But there are
379.44 gaps in other frequencies that the
381.52 Russians often miss. The operator’s
383.68 frequency hopping followed a specific
385.6 pattern. Three hops on common bands to
388.08 confuse Russian operators, then a quick
390.319 jump to a gap frequency for 2 seconds of
392.72 clear audio, then back to hopping. It’s
395.199 a dance that Ukrainian pilots have
397.28 perfected through painful trial and
399.28 error. For 15 agonizing seconds, the
402.56 drone flew blind. The GPS showed the
405.199 drone’s position as 10 km away from
407.84 where it actually was. The Russians were
410.319 spoofing satellite signals, too. But
412.96 Ukrainian pilots trained for this, hours
415.44 in simulators, flying by mental maps,
418.08 counting seconds to estimate distance,
420.479 using the sun and moon’s positions for
422.72 direction when everything else fails.
425.199 Behind the lead drone, three more FPV
427.759 drones followed at precisely 30-second
430.24 intervals. This spacing was crucial. If
432.96 they flew too close together, Russian
435.039 jamming could catch all four
436.639 simultaneously. Too far apart, and the
439.039 lead drones pathf finding through the
440.72 jamming wouldn’t help the others. 30
442.96 seconds meant each drone could follow
444.88 the successful frequency pattern of the
446.96 leader while the Russians were still
448.88 adjusting their jammers. The second
451.039 drone was already entering the jamming
453.039 zone, its operator watching the lead
455.199 drone’s frequency hops and copying them
457.52 exactly. Then the breakthrough they
460.08 needed, the Ukrainian next group
462.08 activated its counter EW system. This
465.28 isn’t subtle. It’s electronic warfare
467.84 brute force. The powerful directional
470.319 transmission that burns a hole through
472.16 the jamming. But it comes with a cost.
474.639 For 30 seconds, the Ukrainian position
477.36 lights up on every Russian detection
479.599 system like a lighthouse in the dark.
482.24 The 30-second exposure window was a
484.56 calculated risk. Ukrainian intelligence
487.199 knew Russian artillery response time
489.52 averaged 45 seconds from detection to
492.08 first shell, but 30 seconds of clear
494.639 signal at a time could push the drones
496.879 through 10 km of heavily jammed
499.039 airspace. Next group operators had their
501.36 hands on the power switch, watching the
503.36 clock. At 28 seconds, they cut
505.919 transmission and relocate, giving them a
508.56 17-second safety margin. Three previous
511.36 missions had validated this timing.
513.599 Aggressive enough to be effective, but
515.76 conservative enough to survive. The
518.0 video feed returned, fuzzy, but
520.0 functional. Through the static, the
522.0 operator could see the railroad tracks
523.839 below. The drone was now following them
526.24 at just 50 m altitude, using the steel
529.279 rails as a navigation guide that no
531.68 amount of GPS spoofing could hide. But
534.399 the R330Z
536.16 was just the first layer. As the drone
538.72 pushed forward, the Russians were
540.64 readying new equipment. The operators
543.12 switched to manual control, abandoning
545.44 any hope of GPS navigation. From here
548.16 on, it would be pure visual flying
550.48 through degraded video. The fuel train
552.8 was now 10 km away, and Russian
555.36 operators were frantically working to
557.44 vector their air defenses onto the
559.44 incoming threat. Russian commanders were
561.68 about to learn a lesson that turned one
563.76 of their most advanced detection systems
566.32 into Ukraine’s greatest advantage. The
569.12 Kasuka 4 system detected them first.
571.92 This massive electronic warfare vehicle
574.24 can spot drone control signals at 150 km
578.16 and now it has a solid track on the
580.32 incoming threats. The Russian operator
582.8 immediately vetoed a Pancer S1 air
585.44 defense system to intercept. The
587.6 Pancer’s radar locked onto the lead
589.68 drone and its automated systems
591.76 calculated an intercept solution. 8
594.56 seconds to missile launch. But the
596.72 Ukrainians had anticipated this.
598.959 Suddenly, six new contacts appeared on
601.279 the Russian screens. Decoy drones
603.6 costing just $200 each were equipped
606.32 with corner reflectors that made them
608.32 look much larger than threats on radar.
610.959 The pancer’s targeting computer couldn’t
612.959 tell the difference between a $200 decoy
615.76 and a $3,000 attack drone carrying
618.48 military ordinance. The Russian operator
621.12 had to make a choice. Engage all targets
623.68 and risk running out of missiles or try
626.16 to identify the real threats and risk
628.56 letting them through. He chose to
630.48 engage. The Pancer’s launcher elevated
633.12 and missiles started streaking into the
635.2 sky, but only four of the six decoys
638.0 activated properly. Two real drones were
640.72 still exposed. Four of six decoys worked
644.16 better than usual. Keep in mind, these
646.48 are garagebuilt from racing drone parts
648.959 and energy drink cans. Cold weather
651.279 drains batteries, jamming fry circuits,
654.0 but even four was enough. The pancer
656.56 just wasted eight of 12 missiles on
658.88 garbage worth less than a laptop.
661.2 Previous Ukrainian attacks sent 20
663.6 decoys just to empty Russian magazines.
666.64 Now, the Pancer had four missiles left
668.8 and a 20inute reload time. Despite being
671.839 nearly out of missiles, it still had its
674.24 two 30 mm autoc cannons. This is where
677.68 terrain masking saved the mission. The
680.079 real attack drones drop just to 10 m
682.64 altitude, literally skimming the grass.
685.519 The Pancer S1 has a minimum engagement
688.079 altitude of 15 m. Anything lower and its
691.279 radar can’t separate the target from
693.36 ground clutter. The drones were
695.36 threading the needle between being too
697.2 high and getting shot or too low and
699.92 crashing into obstacles. Flying at grass
702.64 level meant dodging something every
704.56 second. Power lines cross the terrain
706.8 every few hundred meters, invisible
708.959 until the last moment through degraded
711.04 video. Trees appear suddenly in the
713.6 static. Even large birds become lethal
716.24 obstacles at 80 km hour. Ronin pilots
720.079 memorized terrain using satellite
722.079 photos, creating mental maps of every
724.72 power line, every tree line, every rise
727.68 that could hide obstacles. They practice
730.24 specific routes dozens of times in
732.32 simulators, learning to climb 3 m for
734.959 the power lines at kilometer 27, then to
737.92 bank left to avoid the radio tower at
740.32 kilometer 29. Meanwhile, the Russian
743.279 Kasuka 4 was still tracking the control
745.76 signals, but it had a different problem.
748.32 It could detect the analog video feeds
750.639 but couldn’t jam them effectively.
752.8 Analog signals degrade gracefully. Even
755.44 with 80% interference, you still get 20%
758.639 picture. Digital signals would be
760.639 completely blocked, but they’d also be
762.8 useless for precision strikes at this
764.88 range. 4 km from the target now, and the
768.0 train had received a warning of incoming
770.16 drones. The locomotive’s whistle
772.24 shrieked as the engineer pushed the
774.0 throttle forward, trying to accelerate.
776.72 A moving train at 40 km per hour is
779.6 exponentially harder to hit than a
781.44 stationary target. The hit probability
783.92 drops from 90% to just 30%. But the
787.12 Ukrainians had planned for this, too.
789.519 Through the degraded video feed, the
791.519 operator would see the smoke from the
793.279 locomotive stack. The train was
795.44 accelerating, but it would need time to
797.519 reach full speed. Time it didn’t have.
800.48 The lead drone was now 3 km out,
803.2 screaming towards its target at 80 kmh.
806.48 The next 120 seconds would end with
809.279 either burning drones or a burning
811.36 train. 2 km from impact, the final layer
814.8 of Russian defenses activated. The Pole
817.44 21 jammer mounted on the train itself
819.92 powered up, creating an electromagnetic
822.56 bubble designed to fry any drones
824.88 navigation systems. GPS signals vanished
828.0 instantly. Glonus disappeared. Even the
830.8 magnetic compass went haywire. But the
833.12 video feed, that degraded static field
836.0 analog video, kept coming through. The
838.8 Ukrainians are now flying purely by
841.199 visual reference through a screen that
843.199 looked like a 1980s television with bad
846.0 reception. They could see the railroad
848.32 tracks below, using them like a highway
850.56 leading straight to the target. The
852.639 train was picking up speed, now doing 45
855.519 kmh and accelerating. The first operator
859.04 started counting cars through the
860.56 static. Seven. Six. Five. The lead fuel
865.44 car was the priority target. Hit that
867.92 and the fire would spread backward
869.68 through the train. Miss it and the
871.6 locomotive might decouple the undamaged
873.92 cars and escape with most of the fuel.
876.399 He marked his target mentally. The third
878.88 car behind the locomotive. At 500 m, the
882.639 video started breaking up completely.
884.56 The Pole 21 was winning, overwhelming
887.36 even the analog signal with raw
889.519 electromagnetic noise. The Ukrainians
892.16 were essentially blind, flying on memory
894.639 and trained instinct. 3 seconds to
897.199 impact. 2 seconds. 1. At 10:32 a.m., the
902.24 first drone slammed into the lead fuel
904.32 tanker. The RPG7 warhead detonated on
907.76 impact. It shaped charge, punching
909.92 through the steel wall and spraying
911.6 molten copper into 60,000 L of diesel
915.199 fuel. The explosion was immediate and
917.76 catastrophic. A fireball erupted from
920.48 the car and the train’s emergency brakes
922.8 automatically engaged, bringing the
924.959 entire convoy to a screeching halt. But
927.92 this was just the beginning. 30 seconds
930.72 behind the leader, the second drone was
932.88 already in its terminal dive. The
935.279 massive smoke plume from the first
936.88 strike should have made targeting
938.48 impossible, but the operator used the
940.72 railroad tracks as his guide, counting
942.959 the seconds to estimate distance. The
945.279 second drone hit the fourth car,
947.279 ensuring the fire would spread along the
949.36 entire length of the train. The third
951.68 drone arrived 30 seconds later, its
954.0 operator facing a wall of black smoke
956.24 and flame. The thermal cameras were
958.32 overwhelmed entirely, showing nothing
960.48 but white hot interference. But he knew
963.04 exactly where the seventh car would be.
965.199 They’d studied this train configuration
967.199 for days. Flying blind through the
969.44 smoke, the drone emerged just 50 m from
972.16 its target. The operator had 1 second to
974.959 adjust. The drone struck dead center.
977.92 The fourth and final drone had the
979.839 hardest job. The entire train was now an
982.399 inferno with flames reaching 100 m into
985.519 the sky. But one fuel car at the rear
988.399 remained intact. and leaving it would
990.56 mean leaving salvageable fuel for the
992.56 Russians. He pushed forward into the
994.88 black cloud, counting down from his last
997.36 visual reference. 3 2 1. At 10, 19, and
1003.839 30 seconds, the fourth drone found its
1006.32 mark. The final fuel car erupted,
1008.8 completing the destruction. All 11
1011.12 tankers were now burning. 660,000
1014.72 L of fuel, creating a fire that would
1017.04 burn for 6 hours. The railroad tracks
1020.0 beneath were already warping from the
1021.92 heat, the concrete ties cracking and
1024.0 crumbling. This vital supply line would
1026.319 be unusable for at least 72 hours. Four
1029.839 drones costing a total of $12,000
1033.12 had just destroyed $3 million worth of
1036.079 fuel and infrastructure. But more
1038.4 importantly, they proven that nowhere in
1040.959 occupied territory was safe from
1043.039 Ukrainian strikes. The age of impunity
1045.76 for rear area supply lines is over. If
1048.72 Ukrainian drones reach 35 km today,
1051.84 Russian logistics officers are doing the
1054.08 math. Tomorrow it could be 50. Next week
1057.52 100. No train, no depot, no bridge is
1061.52 safe. And Ukraine has thousands more
1064.0 drones ready to go right now. Bye for
1066.88 now.
.